Entity record

Sergei Vladilenovich KIRIYENKOPerson

Source-verifiedReflects EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions Listobserved not an issuing authority

Sergei Vladilenovich KIRIYENKO appears on the EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions List and 3 other official sanctions lists, designated by US OFAC, European Union, UK HM Treasury (OFSI), UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) under programs UKRAINE-EO13661, RUSSIA-EO14024, CHEM, Chemical Weapons, The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019; reflected as observed on 2026-07-31.

Sanctions

Also known as

  • Sergey Vladenilovich KIRIYENKO
  • Sergey Vladilenovich IZRAITEL
  • Сергей Владиленович КИРИЕНКО (Cyrl)
  • Sergei Vladilenovich KIRIYENKO

Designations

Reason for listing

Per UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) (listed ):

UKSL CHW0012 — Measures: Asset freeze, Travel Ban, Director Disqualification Sanction — As First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, Sergei Kiriyenko is responsible for domestic affairs. The Presidential Office is a state body within Russia that provides support for the President’s work, monitors the implementation of the President’s decisions, and has responsibility for governmental policy and the regime’s most important actions domestically. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexei Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020 were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the state within the attack, and the scale of the operation against Navalny, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexey Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. (official source)

Per UK HM Treasury (OFSI) (listed ):

CHW0012 — As First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, Sergei Kiriyenko is responsible for domestic affairs. The Presidential Office is a state body within Russia that provides support for the President’s work, monitors the implementation of the President’s decisions, and has responsibility for governmental policy and the regime’s most important actions domestically. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexei Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020 were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the state within the attack, and the scale of the operation against Navalny, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexey Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. (official source)

Key properties

Date of birth
Place of birth
Sukhumi; Sukhumi, Georgia; Sukhumi, UNKNOWN
Nationality
Russia
Position
First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office
Gender
male

Identifiers

Secondary sanctions risk:
Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR 589.201 and/or 589.209
Secondary sanctions risk:
See Section 11 of Executive Order 14024.
Gender
Male
OFSI Group ID
13970
UK Sanctions List Unique ID
CHW0012

Addresses

Moscow, Russia

Referenced by

These records' source entries name this entity as linked to them.

Relationships shown here reflect the named source's own fields (e.g. OFAC SDN remarks, OFSI parent/subsidiary fields) verbatim, joined to their listed records by exact name match. They are the issuing authority's statements, not an independent assertion by ProofAML.

Source list & list version

Source listList versionManifest SHA-256StatusVerify
EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions ListSanctions list
European Union (Council / DG FISMA)
20260612-00133df7d2e49ec829fList version (signing pending)manifest
UK Sanctions List (UKSL)Sanctions list
UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)
gb_fcdo_uksl@2026-08-046f5e8b8ed92cccf0List version (signing pending)
UK OFSI Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions TargetsSanctions list
UK HM Treasury — Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI)
20260610-0014d14d0d8a5584fffList version (signing pending)manifest
OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) ListSanctions list
US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control
20260613-001dbfaf0c020d646a9List version (signing pending)manifest

About these sources

The EU's Financial Sanctions Files (FSF) — the European Commission's consolidated feed of every person, group and entity subject to an EU asset freeze under Council CFSP decisions and their implementing Regulations (Russia/Ukraine, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and more).

What a match means: A match is an EU sanctions designation — funds and economic resources generally cannot be made available to this party under EU law; treat as a direct compliance hit.

The UK Sanctions List (UKSL), published by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office — since 28 January 2026 the single, current source for all UK sanctions designations (financial, immigration, trade and transport measures), superseding the older OFSI Consolidated List.

What a match means: A match is a current, binding UK sanctions designation — treat as a direct compliance hit and escalate immediately.

The UK's former OFSI Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets, maintained by HM Treasury. OFSI closed this list on 28 January 2026 — current UK sanctions designations now publish only to the FCDO UK Sanctions List (also in this catalog) — and it is retained here as a historical source.

What a match means: A match reflects a UK financial-sanctions designation recorded before the 28 Jan 2026 cutover; check whether the same party also appears on the current UK Sanctions List, and treat either appearance as a genuine UK sanctions hit, not a stale false positive.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List — the United States' primary sanctions list, naming persons, companies, vessels and aircraft whose property is blocked under US sanctions authorities (IEEPA, TWEA, the Kingpin Act, Global Magnitsky, and program-specific executive orders).

What a match means: A match is a direct US sanctions hit — the named party is designated and, absent a license, US persons are generally barred from dealing with them; escalate immediately rather than clearing the alert yourself.

First observed ; last confirmed present in EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions List list version 20260612-001, observed .

This page reflects the official EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions List, version 20260612-001, as observed on 2026-07-31. ProofAML is not the issuing authority.

Request a correction or dispute (distinguishes a data-handling error on our side from the underlying official designation, which is the issuing authority's record).

How to cite this page

Sergei Vladilenovich KIRIYENKO. ProofAML. This page reflects the official EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions List, version 20260612-001, as observed on 2026-07-31. ProofAML is not the issuing authority. URL: https://proofaml.com/people/sergei-vladilenovich-kiriyenko-nk4642a17d/

Machine-readable export (FTM + lineage): /data/entities/46.json (record key nk4642a17d)